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DOE v. DOE AND THE VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN ACT: A POST-LOPEZ COMMERCE
CLAUSE ANALYSIS
Historically, violence against women, particularly domestic
violence,1 has been treated as non-criminal conduct2 or at best as
1 Statistical studies of domestic violence suggest varying numbers, although all
document a problem of extensive proportions. One of the most carefully researched
and authoritative studies found that approximately 3.8% of all women experienced
physical violence from a partner in any given year, and one out of every six wives
was beaten by her husband at some point. See RICHARD J. GELLES & MURRAY A.
STRAUS, INTIMATE VIOLENCE 104 (1988). Other studies also indicate the magnitude
of the problem. See State v. Huletz, 838 P.2d 1257, 1260 n.3 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992)
(citing report by Alaska's Council on Domestic Violence and Sexual Assault which
indicated that over one million women seek medical treatment for battering injuries
each year); EVE S. BUZAWA & CARL G. BUZAWA, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESPONSE 8 (2d ed. 1996) (indicating that 15% of murders with
known relationship involved "intimates" and that 50% of American couples have had
violent incident, with female victim in 90% of incidents); LEONARD KARP & CHERYL
L. KARP, DOiEsTIC TORTS 2 (Supp. 1996) [hereinafter KARP & KARP 19961 (citing
statistics showing that 16 million women are abused each year by present or former
partners).
2 See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *445 (stating "rule of thumb"
that man could beat his wife if stick he used was "no longer than his thumb"). His-
torically, the common law in England permitted a man to "chastise" his wife, as long
as there was no permanent injury to her. See Reva B. Siegel, "The Rule of Love":
Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2118 (1996) (stating
that although chastisement was no longer acceptable legal theory in America by
1870s, courts have frequently condoned wife-beating). But see Fulgham v. State, 46
Ala. 143, 146-47 (1871) (abrogating chastisement doctrine). The common law doc-
trines relating to the legal identity of husband and wife, see BLACKSTONE, supra, at
*442 ("[B]y marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law .... "), merge the
legal identity of the wife into that of the husband, id. at *433; see also 2 JAMES
KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW *149 (DaCapo Press 1971) (1827)
(describing doctrine in American common law), and the related doctrine of inter-
spousal tort immunity, which barred suits between spouses, caused courts to fre-
quently refuse to adjudicate domestic abuse cases. See LEONARD KARP & CHERYL L.
KARP, DOMESTIC TORTS 28 (1989) [hereinafter KARP & KARP 19891. Even when
wife-beating was finally recognized as a crime, continuing interspousal tort immu-
nity meant that a spouse could not bring a civil suit for injuries. Id. Although the
Married Women's Property Acts gave women the right to independently file suits
and collect damages for injuries, only slowly did courts allow women to file such
suits against their husbands. See Siegel, supra, at 2162-63. Public policy justifica-
tions included maintaining domestic harmony, id. at 2167, marital unity, id. at
2166, and prevention of fraudulent collusion between spouses. See Robert J. Durst
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disapproved of, private behavior. Modem American society has
slowly become attentive to the problem of violence against
women.3 Public recognition of the magnitude and extent of vio-
lence against women has led to fundamental changes in the un-
derstanding and characterization of such violence,4 and in the
method of enforcement of existing criminal' and civil6 sanctions.
II, Emerging Tort Theories Affecting Married and Domestic Partners, 14 No.6
FAIR$HARE 10, 10 (1994). These legal theories also prevented women from charging
their husbands with rape. See id. (noting that in 1981, marriage was "absolute de-
fense to ... rape in 44 states").
3 From 1939 until 1969, no articles on family violence appeared in the Journal
of Marriage and the Family, the most prominent family research journal in the
country. See ELIZABETH PLECi, DOMESTIC TYRANNY 182 (1987) (reporting lack of
public discussion of wife-beating from 1900 to 1970). The feminist movement, in the
early 1970s, began to recognize the problems battered women encountered in the
legal system and pressured police and policy makers to initiate reform. Id. at 183.
These attempts mirrored those of the feminist movement of the mid-1800s. See
Siegel, supra note 2, at 2148.4 See SUSAN S.M. EDWARDS, POLICING "DOMESTIC" VIOLENCE 4, 14 (1989)
(asserting that legislation affecting primarily "public" behavior has effect of margi-
nalizing "private" behavior, including domestic violence); PLECI, supra note 3, at
125-38 (noting early twentieth century treatment of domestic violence as psychiatric
and social work problem giving way to treatment as criminal action, and attempting
reconciliation of two approaches); Siegel, supra note 2, at 2170 (describing use of
family court system to "decriminalize marital violence"). The characterization of
such violence as "domestic" or "intimate" leads to reluctance in acknowledging it as
a public issue. See Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Violence of Privacy, in THE PUBLIC
NATURE OF PRIVATE VIOLENCE 36, 37 (Martha Albertson Fineman & Roxanne
Mykitiuk eds., 1994).
' See DAWN BRADLEY BERRY, THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE SOURCEBOOK 127 (1995)
(observing that almost all states enacted reform in domestic violence procedure
during 1980s); N. ZOE HILTON, LEGAL RESPONSES TO WIFE ASSAULT 3 (1993) (noting
increasing response of legal system to wife assault in 1980s and 1990s). A typical
change involved an increase in police arrests of batterers, and the evolution of police
department policies toward domestic violence. An example of the typical earlier po-
lice view was, "[t]he worst thing you can do is take sides, even if one party is dead
wrong. You don't help by screaming. You can't solve their problems. You just try to
calm them down. If you don't get another complaint that night, you figure you did
your job." George Vescey, 'Family Quarrels' Bedevil Police, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26,
1973, at 37. For a description of how earlier police forces were trained to act as me-
diators in cases of domestic violence and police reluctance to arrest in these situa-
tions, see Raymond I. Parnas, The Police Response to the Domestic Disturbance,
1967 WIS. L. REV. 914 (1967). Although the police response in these situations is
partially colored by the danger and unpredictability of such situations, see id. at 920
n.25, official police responses have changed. In 1980, the National Organization of
Police Chiefs recommended that the goal of police should be to arrest batterers, not
to mediate. See BERRY, supra, at 132. Often, however, official changes in policy are
not easily implemented at the practical, day to day level. See BUZAWA & BUZAWA,
supra note 1, at 241 (suggesting that policies designed to change police and prosecu-
torial responses fail due to lack of attention at administrative level).
6 Beginning with Bennett v. Bennett, 140 So. 378, 379 (Ala. 1932), the doctrine of
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Although modifications and innovations in the treatment of vio-
lence towards women by the police, prosecutorial, and state ju-
dicial systems have occurred slowly, these changes nonetheless
represent significant departures from the common law7 and im-
interspousal tort immunity has been abrogated in most jurisdictions. See Jones v.
Pledger, 363 F.2d 986, 989 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (allowing wrongful death action against
husband); Catlett v. Catlett, 388 S.E.2d 14, 15 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989) (affirming puni-
tive damages award to wife for assault and battery and false imprisonment by for-
mer husband); Shook v. Crabb, 281 N.W.2d 616, 620 (Iowa 1979) (asserting public
policy of allowing redress for injury); Heacock v. Heacock, 520 N.E.2d 151, 153
(Mass. 1988) (holding that divorce did not bar civil tort action for injuries inflicted
during marriage); Coffindaffer v. Coffidaffer, 244 S.E.2d 338, 343-44 (W. Va. 1978)
(noting that spousal immunity "permitted the wife beater to practice his twisted
frustrations secure in the knowledge that he was immune from civil action except
for a divorce, and that any criminal penalty would ordinarily be a modest fine").
7 See supra note 2 (discussing common law doctrines). Furthermore, in most
states marriage is no longer an absolute shield against prosecution for the rape of
one's wife. See KARP & KARP 1989, supra note 2, at 38; see also Warren v. State, 336
S.E.2d 221, 222, 225-26 (Ga. 1985) (holding that Georgia rape and aggravated sod-
omy statutes do not include spouse exception, and stating "rape and aggravated
sodomy are not sexual acts of an ardent husband ... they are acts of violence"); Peo-
ple v. M.D., 595 N.E.2d 702, 711 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (holding that marital exception
for criminal sexual assault was unconstitutional violation of equal protection and
due process); People v. Liberta, 474 N.E.2d 567, 573-76 (N.Y. 1984) (holding that
marital exception to rape and sodomy statutes was unconstitutional).
Emerging tort theories also indicate a more sensitive and creative response,
legislatively and judicially, on the part of states. This has included tort claims for
intentional infliction of emotional distress, often in conjunction with a divorce claim.
See KARP & KARP 1996, supra note 1, at 46; see also Curtis v. Firth, 850 P.2d 749,
755 (Idaho 1993) (applying intentional infliction of emotional distress theory to bat-
tered nonspousal partner); Henriksen v. Cameron, 622 A.2d 1135, 1137 (Me. 1993)
(affirming judgment of damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress re-
sulting from physical and verbal abuse); Ruprecht v. Ruprecht, 599 A.2d 604, 606
(N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1991) (holding action for intentional infliction of emotional
distress is available between spouses, notwithstanding absence of physical injury);
Weisman v. Weisman, 485 N.Y.S.2d 570, 571 (App. Div. 1985) (holding husband's
threats to wife's life and display of bullet gave rise to claim for intentional infliction
of emotional distress); Davis v. Bostick, 580 P.2d 544, 547 (Or. 1978) (allowing suit
for intentional infliction of emotional distress where husband threatened to kill
wife); Johnson v. Johnson, 654 A.2d 1212, 1216 (R.I. 1995) (allowing ex-wife to bring
slander cause of action against ex-husband who called her "whore" in public place);
Massey v. Massey, 807 S.W.2d 391, 396 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991) (allowing intentional
infliction of emotional distress claim even in absence of physical injury). One of the
more interesting recent developments has been the treatment of claims for damages
for battered woman syndrome as a continuing tort, thereby enabling the victim to
sue for the entire history of abuse. See Curtis, 850 P.2d at 754-55 (applying continu-
ous tort theory to ongoing abusive relationship); Giovine v. Giovine, 663 A.2d 109,
114-15 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995) (holding acts causing syndrome, not syn-
drome itself, continuing tort); Cusseaux v. Pickett, 652 A.2d 789, 794 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Law Div. 1994) (stating that battered woman syndrome constitutes "continuing
pattern of abuse"). Battered woman syndrome increasingly is being recognized by
state courts as a legitimate psychological diagnosis. Battered woman syndrome is
1997] 467
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provements in the treatment of women victimized by violence.8
the development of a response by a woman to a series of beatings. Violent episodes
tend to involve a tripartite cycle. Initially, there is a build-up of tension due to a se-
ries of small incidents. In the second stage, the actual battering occurs, triggered by
a random incident (but in reality the culmination of the escalating threat). In the
third stage, the batterer apologizes, behaves lovingly toward the woman, and often
promises that the battering will not occur again. See LENORE E. WALKER, THE
BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME 55-70 (1984). The development of escalating tension
in the first phase creates a scenario in which the woman may reasonably believe
danger is imminent at any time. Additionally, the slow build-up of tension, and the
randomness of the act which ultimately results in the battering, may lead the
woman to believe she can control the situation by preventing the earlier events
which triggered the battery, thus giving her a false sense of control over the situa-
tion. This may be reinforced by the batterer's contrition after the event. Thus, ulti-
mately the woman may experience violence as both constantly imminent and un-
predictable. As a result of what Walker calls the "cycle of violence," battered women
may develop a "learned helplessness" approach and feel incapable of taking action to
protect or extricate themselves. See LENORE E. WALKER, TERRIFYING LOVE 49-50
(1989) [hereinafter TERRIFYING LOVE]. Courts have increasingly admitted evidence
as to the syndrome. See Arcoren v. United States, 929 F.2d 1235, 1241 (8th Cir.
1991) (allowing evidence of battered woman syndrome to explain victim's recanta-
tion); People v. Humphrey, 921 P.2d 1, 2 (Cal. 1996) (holding evidence of battered
woman syndrome relevant to determining reasonableness of woman's belief that
killing husband was necessary for self defense); State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 378
(N.J. 1984) (allowing expert evidence regarding battered woman syndrome in claim
of self-defense); People v. Ellis, 650 N.Y.S.2d 503, 509 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1996) (allowing
evidence of battered woman syndrome as explanation of victim's recantation); Peo-
ple v. Torres, 488 N.Y.S.2d 358, 363 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1985) (same); see also State v.
Daws, 662 N.E.2d 805, 811 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994) (allowing evidence of battered
woman syndrome as victim's experience and fears were not otherwise understand-
able to jury).
8 See supra notes 5-7 (discussing improvements in treatment of battered
women); see also BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 1, at 100 (describing increase in
mandatory arrest policies); PLECK, supra note 3, at 198-99 (explaining changing at-
titudes of police and prosecutors toward domestic violence). The changes have also
been impelled, in part, by suits brought by battered women challenging current po-
lice and prosecutorial practices. See, e.g., Nearing v. Weaver, 670 P.2d 137, 140 (Or.
1983) (finding valid cause of action against police department for failure to enforce
restraining order against father or husband). Although the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in DeShaney v. Winnebago County, 489 U.S. 189, 197-98 (1989) (holding that
municipal social services department owed no duty of care to child abused by father
even after agency investigated allegations of abuse because agency had no "special
relationship" with child out of which such duty could arise), may have limited the
availability of suits by battered women against police and prosecutorial offices on
some theories of liability, actions based on showing a persistent pattern of domestic
discrimination or based on state statutes are available. See Catherine F. Klein &
Leslye E. Orloff, Providing Legal Protection for Battered Women: An Analysis of
State Statutes and Case Law, 21 HOFsTRA L. REV. 801, 1015-19 & nn.1344-57
(1993). As an example of judicial changes, presently all but two states allow for an
ex parte temporary order of protection, which may also include provisions regarding
child custody and support. See William G. Bassler, The Federalization of Domestic
Violence: An Exercise in Cooperative Federalism or a Misallocation of Federal Judi-
[Vol. 71:465
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Despite state progress, however, Congress enacted the Violence
Against Women Act of 1994 ("VAWA), 9 in part due to continuing
criticisms of the provision of justice in the state courts. 10
VAWA's provisions include a broad array of programs to ad-
vance the treatment of women victimized by violence, ranging
from funding for rape education and prevention to training for
state and federal judges. One of the more far-reaching provi-
sions of VAWA creates a new civil right in the form of freedom
from gender-related violence, and provides a civil suit for dam-
ages as a federal remedy." The civil rights remedy of VAWA was
cial Resources?, 48 RUTGERS L. REv. 1139, 1163-64 (1996).
9 Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1902 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 8, 18, and 42 U.S.C.). VAWA was enacted as part of the Violent Crime Control
and Law Enforcement Act of 1994. In addition to the civil rights provision which is
the focus of this Comment, VAWA includes, among other things, funding for
women's shelters, see 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a) (1994), funding for rape education and pre-
vention, see 42 U.S.C. § 10418 (1994), and training for federal and state judges. See
42 U.S.C. §§ 13992 & 14001 (1994); see also Kerrie E. Maloney, Gender-Motivated
Violence and the Commerce Clause: The Civil Rights Provision of the Violence
Against Women Act After Lopez, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1876, 1883 & n.24 (1996). Addi-
tionally, there is a provision making it a federal crime to cross state lines and har-
ass, stalk, or injure one's spouse in violation of a protection order. 18 U.S.C. §
2262(a) (1994); see also Abraham Abramovsky, Interstate Domestic Violence and
Murder: Are They the Same?, N.Y. L.J., July 12, 1996, at 3 (questioning use of fed-
eral statute in case of woman accused of murdering husband for profit).
'0 See BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 1, at 96 (indicating that violent crimes
between intimates are still taken less seriously by courts, in that many misde-
meanor violence cases between intimates would have been felonies if committed by
stranger); David A. Ford & Mary Jean Regoli, The Criminal Prosecution of Wife As-
saulters, in LEGAL RESPONSES TO WIFE ASSAULT 129-30 (N. Zoe Hilton ed., 1993)
(referring to research finding that overwhelming majority of arrests for domestic
violence did not result in prosecution). Continuing state courtroom prejudices
against women were also documented during the congressional hearings on the
Violence Against Women Act (VAWA). See S. REP. No. 102-197, at 107, 125 (1991)
(containing numerous examples of sexism within state court systems occurring in
trials involving violence against women).
" The statute provides, in pertinent part:
(b) Right to be free from crimes of violence. All persons within the United
States shall have the right to be free from crimes of violence motivated by
gender (as defined in subsection (d) of this section).
(c) Cause of action. A person (including a person who acts under color of any
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State) who commits a
crime of violence motivated by gender and thus deprives another of the right
declared in subsection (b) of this section shall be liable to the party injured,
in an action for the recovery of compensatory and punitive damages, injunc-
tive and declaratory relief, and such other relief as a court may deem appro-
priate.
(d) Definitions. For purposes of this section-
(1) the term "crime of violence motivated by gender" means a crime of vio-
lence committed because of gender or on the basis of gender, and due, at
1997] 469
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enacted in recognition of the reality that, like other hate crimes,
many acts of violence towards women are motivated by gender
bias.12 This provision has been the subject of controversy.13 The
chief sources of the debate center on concerns about Congress's
constitutional authority for such an enactment in the wake of the
Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Lopez,' which held
that congressional legislation enacted pursuant to the Commerce
Clause 5 must at least relate to an economic activity which sub-
stantially affects interstate commerce, 6 and the statute's effect
on the burgeoning docket of federal courts. Recently, in Doe v.
Doe, 8 the United States District Court of Connecticut denied a
motion challenging the constitutionality of the civil remedy por-
tion of VAWA, holding that VAWA was a "proper exercise of con-
gressional power" 9 under the Commerce Clause, and that Lopez
required no more than the application of a rational basis test in
determining constitutionality.0
In Doe, the plaintiff brought a claim under VAWA, asserting
that the defendant, her husband, deprived her of the "federal
right to be free from ... alleged gender-based violence." 2' The
plaintiff sought damages for injuries allegedly caused by her
husband' between 1978 and 1995, including battered woman's
least in part, to an animus based on the victim's gender ....
42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994).
2 See Julie Goldscheid, Will a Vital New Women's Right Be Withdrawn?, NAT'L
L.J., Aug. 26, 1996, at A20. To constitute a crime for purposes of this statute, it is
not necessary that the violent act result in indictment, prosecution, or conviction. 42
U.S.C. § 13981(d)(2)(A) (1994).
1See Bassler, supra note 8, at 1161-62 (criticizing civil rights provision as un-
necessary since states are responding, while approving of other provisions as part of
national campaign); Robert Jerome Glennon, Federalism as a Regional Issue: "Get
Out! and Give Us More Money," 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 829, 834-35 (1996) (questioning
constitutionality of VAWA). But see, e.g., Maloney, supra note 9, at 1876 (calling
provision "pioneering").
'4 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
' The Commerce Clause grants Congress the power "[t]o regulate Commerce ...
among the several States .... U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
'8 See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630-31. The Act made possession of a gun within
1000 feet of a school a federal crime. Gun-Free School Zones Act, 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)
(1994).
'7 See Bassler, supra note 8, at 1141-42.
'8 929 F. Supp. 608 (D. Conn. 1996).
'9 Id. at 610.
20 Id. at 612-13.
21 Id. at 610.
2" Doe, 929 F. Supp. at 610. These acts included both physical and mental abuse.
Among other abuses, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant had kicked her, thrown
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syndrome,2 post-traumatic stress disorder, and depression.'
The defendant made a motion to dismiss, challenging the enact-
ment of the civil rights remedy as outside of congressional legis-
lative authority under the Commerce Clause.'
The district court denied the defendant's motion, holding
that the civil rights provision of VAWA was constitutional under
the Commerce Clause.26 The court rejected the defendant's ar-
gument that Lopez overturned the rationality test 7 and declared
that "Lopez reaffirmed the rationality test .... "28 The court cited
congressional findings on the relationship between gender-
objects at her, destroyed her property, and forced her to maintain "and [lay out] his
clothes for his numerous dates with his many girlfriends and mistresses." Id.
2 Id.; see TERRIFYING LOVE, supra note 7, at 35 (providing one doctor's defini-
tion of syndrome).
24 Doe, 929 F. Supp. at 610.
Id. Interestingly, as VAWA was passed prior to the Supreme Court decision in
United States v. Lopez, Congress showed little concern about its powers to enact it.
See S. REP. No. 102-199, at 139-41 (1991) (stating that Commerce Clause allows
Congress "to reach conduct that has even the slightest effect on interstate com-
merce" and that "[gender-based violence meets the modest threshold required").
The defendant moved to dismiss under both the Commerce Clause and the Four-
teenth Amendment. Doe, 929 F. Supp. at 610. Although Doe determined that VAWA
was constitutional under the Commerce Clause, it did not reach the question of
whether VAWA was constitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment. This Com-
ment will focus on the Commerce Clause, although Congress also declared its
authority to enact the civil rights remedy of VAWA pursuant to the Fourteenth
Amendment. See 42 U.S.C. § 13981(a) (1994). Such assertion of authority is highly
problematic, however, as generally statutes enacted under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment have been limited to proscribing state action. See United States v. Guest, 383
U.S. 745, 755 (1966) ("It is a commonplace that rights under the Equal Protection
Clause itself arise only where there has been involvement of the State or of one
acting under the color of its authority."). Although section five of the Fourteenth
Amendment grants relatively broad congressional powers, see Katzenbach v. Mor-
gan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966), it is questionable whether it covers private actors. See
Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic & State Univ., 935 F. Supp. 779, 799-800 (W.D.
Va. 1996) (holding that Congress exceeded scope of authority in enacting civil rights
provision of VAWA under Fourteenth Amendment); see also Bassler, supra note 8,
at 1170 (noting that extension of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) to gender discrimination or to
acts not involving conspiracies is problematic).
2' Doe, 929 F. Supp. at 617.
27Id. at 613.
Id. Although the defendant did not argue for a heightened rational basis re-
view, the Doe court also held that Lopez had not limited the rationality test. Id. The
Doe court, however, disregarded that the Court in Lopez grounded its discussion of
the rationality test in the necessity for the Court to determine whether an activity
substantially affected interstate commerce. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624,
1630 (1995). Significantly, the Court noted the importance of maintaining a distinc-
tion between the national and the local, and warned of the limits on Congress's
Commerce Clause power. Id. at 1634.
19971
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motivated violence and interstate commerce."9 Lopez was distin-
guished on the basis that in Lopez, Congress provided "only theo-
retical impact arguments" rather than statistical findings dem-
onstrating a correlation.0 Although noting that "the Court's
inquiry is an independent one,"31 the court limited its role to de-
termining whether Congress had presented data adequate to
demonstrate a link between gender-related violence and inter-
state commerce. The court relied on the congressional findings
to determine that the statute satisfied the "rational basis" test,32
stating that "because of the extensive compilation of data, testi-
mony, and reports on which Congress based its findings, this
Court is not left to speculate."33 The court reasoned that an in-
trastate activity substantially affected interstate commerce if it
was within the "outer-limit of Congress' authority,"' and indi-
cated that this limit was established by the Supreme Court in
Wickard v. Filburn.35 Thus, the Doe court concluded that the
2 Doe, 929 F. Supp. at 613-14. The statistics used by Congress varied from
numbers referring to violence against all women, to those involving domestic vio-
lence only. Although it was stated that not all violence against women would be sub-
sumed under the civil rights remedy, no attempt was made to parse out the per-
centage of violence against women due to gender animus. Thus, the extent of the
effect of gender-motivated violence on interstate commerce is unknown. See infra
note 60.
30 Doe, 929 F. Supp. at 613.
3' Id. at 612.
32 Id. at 615.
'3 Id. at 614.
34 Id. The court pointed to Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), as instruc-
tive of when an intrastate activity substantially affects interstate commerce. Doe,
929 F. Supp. at 614.
"317 U.S. 111 (1942). Wickard involved a challenge by a wheat-growing farmer
to a quota system under the Agriculture Adjustment Act of 1941, asserting that the
application of the quota penalty to wheat grown on the farm and remaining on the
farm was unconstitutional, because it did not involve interstate commerce. Id. at
113-14. The Supreme Court upheld the Act, noting that even local activity can "be
reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate com-
merce." Id. at 125. The Court in Wickard applied an "aggregate" theory to find that
purely local activities could have a substantial affect on interstate commerce, in that
the cumulative impact of such activities done by many farmers would have an effect
on the interstate price of wheat. Id. at 127-28. The court in Doe analogized the cu-
mulative impact of local activities in Wickard leading to a decrease in demand for
wheat to the cumulative impact of gender violence limiting women's participation in
the workplace and marketplace.. Doe, 929 F. Supp. at 614. The court in Doe, how-
ever, failed to note that the regulation in Wickard was characterized by the Court in
economic terms, designed to prevent fluctuations in wheat prices. Wickard, 317 U.S.
at 115. Even after Lopez, such economic activities will usually meet a rational ba-
sis/substantially affects test.
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congressional findings that women's fear of gender-based vio-
lence had resulted in a limited participation in the workplace
and marketplace, thereby substantially affecting interstate
commerce, established congressional authority under the Com-
merce Clause."
It is submitted that the Doe court erred in its analysis in
several respects. First, the Doe court misconstrued the appro-
priate post-Lopez review for a "noneconomic" statute such as
VAWA. Second, the Doe court, in its reliance on the Wickard ag-
gregate theory, failed to distinguish between regulation of eco-
nomic and noneconomic activity. Third, the Doe court overem-
phasized the importance of congressional findings, and failed to
recognize that findings such as VAWA's have no logical stopping
point. Part I of this Comment examines these criticisms, and
suggests analyses under which VAWA would not pass constitu-
tional muster. Part II considers the related public policy ques-
tions of federalism, intrusion on traditional state regulation and
proscription of violence against women, and concerns over the
increasing federal docket. The Comment concludes that the civil
rights remedy of VAWA, but not its other components, creates
questionable public policy.
I. APPLICATION OF LOPEZ TO DOE
From 1937 until 1994, Congress, with the support of the fed-
eral judiciary, steadily increased the scope of federal regulatory
power through enactments under the Commerce Clause.7 As the
3' Doe, 929 F. Supp. at 615. Several months after the decision in Doe, the West-
ern District of Virginia in Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic & State Univ., 935 F.
Supp. 779 (W.D. Va. 1996), dismissed a claim brought under VAWA, finding that
Congress exceeded its authority under the Commerce Clause and Fourteenth
Amendment by enacting VAWA_ Id. at 801. Brzonkala involved a university student
who brought a claim under § 13981(c), alleging that she was raped by several uni-
versity football players, at least one of whom later made statements indicative of
gender animus. Id. at 782. The court in Brzonkala, in dismissing the claim, noted
the similarities between VAWA and the Lopez statute, and held that despite the
provision of congressional findings, it was the court's task to provide an independent
judicial review. Id. at 788-89. The court reasoned that the "chain of causation" de-
picted in the congressional findings would by analogy allow Congress to enact
sweeping regulations. Id. at 793.
Congress' power to regulate commerce between the states was originally es-
tablished in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 240 (1824). Prior to 1937, the
Supreme Court had blocked a number of New Deal statutes passed under Com-
merce Clause authority, as not having shown the requisite effect on interstate com-
merce. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (striking down regulation
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scope of subject matter which could be regulated as affecting in-
terstate commerce broadened, the Court was extremely deferen-
tial to the legislative branch.38 In 1995, however, the Supreme
Court, in Lopez v. United States,39 struck down the Gun-Free
School Zones Act,4° declaring that Congress did not have consti-
tutional authority to pass the Act under the Commerce Clause.41
The Court noted that the statutory language of the Act made no
reference to any commercial or economic activity, nor did it con-
tain jurisdictional language which would ensure a link to inter-
state commerce.42 The Court reasoned that although economic
of miner working hours); A.L.A_ Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S.
495 (1935) (invalidating regulation of interstate employment practices under Na-
tional Industrial Recovery Act). Frustrated with the blocking of New Deal programs,
President Roosevelt proposed his "Court-packing" plan. See JOHN E. NOWAK &
RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 154-55 (5th ed. 1995). Due either to
this threat or to worsening economic conditions, in 1937, the Supreme Court began
to broaden the scope of congressional power. Id. at 155. Beginning with NLRB v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 31, 37 (1937) (allowing regulation if activ-
ity directly burdened interstate commerce), congressional power slowly expanded
until the federal government controlled what seemed to be completely intrastate
activity. See Wickard, 317 U.S. at 125 (asserting that "rational basis" test justified
federal regulation of local farmer who sold all produce intrastate or used crops him-
self); see also Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264,
277 (1981) (allowing federal regulation of strip miners on theory that states which
limited mining were at unfair advantage against states that did not). By the 1960s,
Congress was permitted to enact social legislation through the Commerce Clause.
See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 303-04 (1964) (upholding Title H of Civil
Rights Act which prohibits racial discrimination in eating establishments); see also
Michael C. Carroll & Paul R. Dehmel, Comment, United States v. Lopez: Reevaluat-
ing Congressional Authority Under the Commerce Clause, 69 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 579,
590-597 (1995) (tracing development of "substantially affects" and "rational basis"
tests).
' See NOWAK & ROrUNDA, supra note 37, at 155 (indicating that Commerce
Clause has been viewed as "broad grant of power" for Congress); Thomas E. Baker,
A View to the Future of Judicial Federalism: "Neither Out Far Nor in Deep," 45
CASE W. RES. L. REv. 705, 790 (1995) (describing Supreme Court as deferring to
Congress at "expense of state sovereignty"); Deborah Jones Merritt, Reflections on
United States v. Lopez: COMMERCE!, 94 MICH. L. REV. 674, 682 (1995) (noting
that rationality review is "extremely deferential" to Congress); Donald H. Zeigler,
The New Activist Court, 45 AM. U. L. REv. 1367, 1392 (1996) (same); Carroll &
Dehmel, supra note 37, at 593 (noting broad reach of Commerce Clause); Larry E.
Gee, Comment, Federalism Revisited: The Supreme Court Resurrects the Notion of
Enumerated Powers by Limiting Congress's Attempt to Federalize Crime, 27 ST.
MARYS L.J. 151, 168 (1995) (criticizing Supreme Court "rubber stamping" of con-
gressional enactments).
39 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
40 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (1994); see supra note 6.
41 Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1626.
4 Id. at 1630-31. The Court reaffirmed the three categories of activities which
Congress can regulate under the Commerce Clause: channels of interstate coin-
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activities which have a substantial affect on interstate commerce
can be regulated, possession of a gun near a school zone does not
involve economic activity.43 Additionally, although the Court did
not hold that noneconomic activity could never be regulated un-
der the Commerce Clause," the Court did envision that under
the government's "cost of crime" and "national productivity" ar-
guments the potential reach of the Commerce Clause would be
limitless.45 Thus, in analyzing whether a noneconomic statute
substantially affects interstate commerce, courts must heed the
warning of Lopez that arguments which theoretically could give
Congress unbounded power to regulate are untenable.46
The meaning of Lopez has captivated commentators and led
to varying predictions of its significance.' At the very least,
however, as a statute which regulates noneconomic activity,
VAWA is precisely the type of law which should receive the
heightened judicial review demanded by Lopez. The Doe court
failed in this regard by applying a deferential, lower level of
merce, instrumentalities of interstate commerce, and activities which "substantially
affect" interstate commerce. Id. at 1629-30. In setting forth the last category, the
Supreme Court rectified previous case language ambiguity and asserted that regu-
lated activities must meet the "substantially affects" test. Id.; see also Carroll &
Dehmel, supra note 37, at 599.
43 Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630. The Court noted that although drawing a line be-
tween commercial and noncommercial activities is at times uncertain, such uncer-
tainty is inherent in a system where limits are set on congressional powers. Id. at
1633. For a discussion of the application of "fuzzy logic" concepts (i.e., human rea-
soning defines classes in terms of representative and less-representative members,
creating classes that are not "crisp") and the question of how "commerce-like" an
activity is, see Merritt, supra note 38, at 738-50.
4See Maloney, supra note 9, at 1919-20 (indicating that Lopez Court did not
assert that only economic activity can be constitutionally regulated).
45 Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1632. The "cost of crime" argument indicated that pos-
session of a gun might lead to violent crime, and violent crime affected the economy
through its own costs and by reducing travel. Id. The "national productivity" argu-
ment suggested that guns near schools hampered education and ultimately pro-
duced less productive citizens. Id.
4Id. "Thus, if we were to accept the Governmentfs arguments, we are hard-
pressed to posit any activity by an individual that Congress is without power to
regulate." Id.; see also Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic & State Univ., 935 F. Supp.
779, 792-98 (W.D. Va. 1996) (noting use of similar arguments would lead to un-
bounded congressional powers); Merritt, supra note 38, at 677 (reasoning that Lopez
proposes that "rationale for congressional regulation must recognize some bounds
on federal power").
47 Compare, e.g., Merritt, supra note 38, at 738-39 (characterizing Lopez as
"limited decision" which will not be significantly extended by Court), with Carroll &
Debmel, supra note 37, at 608 (noting that Lopez represents "important change" in
evaluation of congressional authority), and Gee, supra note 38, at 191 (suggesting
that Lopez sent clear message of restraint to Congress).
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scrutiny.48 Additionally, although the provision of congressional
findings for VAWA resolves one of the weaknesses addressed by
the Lopez Court, the mere existence of congressional findings
will not suffice to legitimize noneconomic statutes where, as
here, such findings would extend Commerce Clause power un-
duly.48
A. Proximate Cause Analysis of VA WA
Lopez did not clearly announce what form of heightened ju-
dicial review is appropriate." It has been suggested, however,
that the appropriate analysis for a noneconomic statute is akin
to a proximate cause analysis.51 In order for a noneconomic stat-
ute to meet the "substantially affects," toughened rational basis
test,52 there must be a relationship between the regulated activ-
ity and interstate commerce "strong enough or close enough to
justify federal intervention."53 This type of analysis has several
4 Although the court in Doe acknowledged the independent judicial role of re-
view, Doe v. Doe, 929 F. Supp. 608, 614 (D. Conn. 1996), the court's truncated
analysis of VAWA essentially circumvented the proper judicial review.
See Glennon, supra note 13, at 835 (analogizing congressional VAWA findings
on effect of gender-motivated violence on interstate commerce to government's ar-
guments in Lopez).
50 United States v. Wall, 92 F.3d 1444, 1459 (6th Cir. 1996) (Boggs, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 690 (1997). "Lopez is un-
clear on the proper level of constitutional review that courts should now apply to
Commerce Clause challenges." Id. But see Carroll & Debmel, supra note 37, at 599-
600 (stating that Court adopted "substantially affects" test and discarded "rational
basis" test). Most courts and commentators, however, have not agreed with Doe's
proposition that the prior rationality test is unchanged in any way. See Wall, 92
F.3d at 1459 (Boggs, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citations omitted)
(citing numerous cases and treatises on question of scope of review post-Lopez).
" See Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic & State Univ., 935 F. Supp. 779, 791
(1996) (emphasizing necessity of considering "proximity of the regulated activity to
commerce"); Merritt, supra note 38, at 679 (analogizing strength of relationship
necessary between activity and interstate commerce to level of causation necessary
to justify finding of negligence in tort law). For alternative analyses which also focus
on the extent to which a statute interferes with a traditional state domain, see Wall,
92 F.3d at 1455 (Boggs, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (limiting con-
gressional authority to activities closely linked to commerce); Stephen R. McAllister,
Controversial Decisions of the 1994-95 Supreme Court Term: Lopez Has Some Merit,
5 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POLY 9, 11 (1996) (espousing that proper test is to examine in-
trusion into States' domain). The Court in Lopez indicated that the question of cau-
sation "is necessarily one of degree." Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1633 (quoting NLRB v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937)).
12 See Merritt, supra note 38, at 677 (describing Lopez as reducing judicial def-
erence through "toughened rational basis standard").
5' Id. at 679.
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advantages. First, it serves as a reminder that there must be
some limits on Congress' power, otherwise, the mere provision of
congressional findings would suffice to allow the exercise of con-
stitutional power under the Commerce Clause.' Such a result
would clash with the thrust of the Lopez opinion.55 Second, a
proximate cause analysis also provides a consistent and princi-
pled basis for determining how to analyze Congress's power to
enact noneconomic statutes under the Commerce Clause." Fi-
nally, it provides limits consistent with public policy concerns of
the appropriate balance between federal and state powers.57 The
closer a legislated activity is to one traditionally reserved to the
states, the "tighter" the cause-effect relationship between the
activity and interstate commerce will have to be.
Under such an analysis, the civil rights remedy of VAWA is
problematic because it impinges upon and intersects with areas
traditionally reserved to the states, including tort actions, di-
vorce, domestic violence, and general criminal matters.5 There-
fore, under Lopez, a very tight link between gender-related vio-
lence and interstate commerce should have to be shown.
Nevertheless, the court in Doe applied a traditional rational ba-
sis test and held that the congressional findings demonstrated
the necessary substantial effect.5 9 The congressional hearings
4 Brzonkala, 935 F. Supp. at 792-93 ("If such a chain of causation [showing an
effect on the national economy] sufficed, Congress's power would extend to an un-
bounded extreme.").
See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1634; Wall, 92 F.3d at 1462-63 (Boggs, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (requiring rationales for regulation to have "logical
stopping point").
a Under a proximate cause analysis, a balancing and weighing process can take
place, during which issues such as the economic or noneconomic nature of the stat-
ute, the level of intrusion on the domain of the states, and considerations of federal-
ism can be addressed.
57 See infra notes 83-99 and accompanying text. It is likely that there will often
be some correlation between the extent to which the statute intrudes into tradi-
tional state domain and its "distance," in proximate cause terms, from interstate
commerce.
6' See Bassler, supra note 8, at 1141-42 (questioning need for federalizing area
traditionally left to states); McAllister, supra note 51, at 12 (noting strong tradition
of domestic violence issues exclusively within domain of states).
" Doe v. Doe, 929 F. Supp. 608, 613-14 (D. Conn. 1996). The Court in Lopez ul-
timately did not apply the rational basis test to the statute at issue. Rather, the
Coures holding is grounded in concerns about the overreaching of Congress. See
Ann Althouse, Enforcing Federalism After United States v. Lopez, 38 ARiz. L. REV.
793, 799 (1996) (finding that although Court did not disavow rational basis test in
Lopez, Court did not utilize test in its analysis, nor did Justice Kennedy mention
test in concurrence); cf. Carroll & Dehmel, supra note 37, at 599-600 (positing that
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did not parse out, however, either "qualitatively [or] quantita-
tively," the effects of gender-related violence on interstate com-
merce, as opposed to the effects of all violent acts toward
women.
60
Additionally, the suggested links between violence against
women and interstate commerce could apply equally well to any
violent behavior. For example, suggestions that women are less
likely to go out in the evening to movies, or to travel interstate
because of fear of violence,6' could be asserted of violence against
any subgroup of the population or of the population as a whole."
It was exactly this sort of analysis in Justice Breyer's dissent in
Lopez-linking gun possession near schools to interstate com-
merce through its deleterious effect on children's ability to
learn -which the majority in Lopez rejected, noting that such
Court in Lopez abandoned rational basis test in favor of substantially affects test).
60 Thus, the 1991 Senate Report cited statistics showing, for example, that one-
third of all murdered women were killed by their present or former boyfriends or
husbands, see S. REP. No. 102-197, at 38 (1991), and noted that "[s]tate remedies
are inadequate to fight bias crimes against women." Id. at 41. The report further
noted that 50% of women do not use public transit after dark and 75% of women do
not go to the movies alone after dark due to fear of rape. Id. The Senate utilized
these numbers to assert an effect on interstate commerce. At the same time, how-
ever, the report notes that the civil rights remedy will not cover "random muggings
or beatings in the home or elsewhere," id. at 48, and that the "plaintiff must prove
that the crime of violence-whether an assault, a kidnapping, or a rape-was moti-
vated by gender," id. at 49, thus suggesting that not all rapes would be considered
"gender-motivated." In discussing how to determine whether an attack was gender-
motivated, the report uses the rather unhelpful example of a serial rapist who
"hurls misogynist slurs" as he rapes. Id. at 50. Although presumably gender-
motivated violence extends beyond this example, the report does not attempt to de-
termine what percentage of violence against women is gender-related. Alternative
theoretical analyses based on violence against women as power-related or, in the
case of domestic violence, as related to systemic violence within the family, are pos-
sible. See Patrick Letellier, Gay and Bisexual Male Domestic Violence Victimization,
in 1 DOMESTIC PARTNER ABUSE 3-7 (L. Kevin Hamberger & Claire Renzetti, eds.,
1996) (criticizing overemphasis on gender explanations and stressing need for social
and psychological theories to explain same-sex battering). Generally, other articles
supporting the constitutionality of the civil rights remedy also point to the magni-
tude of the effect of violence against women on the national economy. See, e.g., Ma-
loney, supra note 9, at 1878-83 & nn.9-22. Again, the extent to which the docu-
mented violence is gender-related is not specified.
61 Doe v. Doe, 929 F. Supp. 608, 613-14 (D. Conn. 1996).
See Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic & State Univ., 935 F. Supp. 779, 792-93
(W.D. Va. 1996) (noting that such argument could be used to extend commerce
power unreasonably broadly).
63 United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1659-61 (1995) (Breyer, J., dissent-
ing). Justice Breyer linked violence in schools to the school dropout rate and the
quality of education in inner-city schools, and described education as "inextricably
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analysis would allow direct regulation of education and family
law."
B. Cumulative Impact/Aggregate Theory
After utilizing a rational basis test, the court in Doe focused
on the "repetitive nationwide impact" of gender-motivated vio-
lence on the national economy. 65 The court analogized VAWA to
the statute upheld in Wickard v. Filburn66 in determining that
VAWA met the "substantially affects" test, thus using an aggre-
gate theory focusing on the cumulative impact of local activities
on interstate commerce. ' The Lopez Court distinguished the
statute at issue in Wickard from the Gun-Free School Zones Act,
however, by classifying Wickard as an instance of federal regu-
lation of an economic activity.' The Court in Lopez noted that
the regulation in Wickard was directed at the economic activity
of limiting the market price of wheat. Thus, even intrastate ac-
tivity, such as home production and consumption of wheat,
which affects the national market price could be regulated con-
stitutionally under the Commerce Clause.69 Those seeking to ex-
tend Congress's permissible level of control when regulating eco-
nomic activity to the regulation of noneconomic activity, such as
the Gun-Free School Zones Act and VAWA, fail to recognize that
economic and noneconomic statutes should be scrutinized differ-
ently.
70
intertwined" with the economy. Id. at 1659-60 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
4 Id. at 1633 ("Justice Breyer's rationale lacks any real limits because, depend-
ing on the level of generality, any activity can be looked upon as commercial.").
c" Doe, 929 F. Supp. at 614.
c 317 U.S. 111 (1942); see supra note 35 and accompanying text for discussion
of case.
67Doe, 929 F. Supp. at 614.
Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630. The Court described Wickard as "perhaps the most
far reaching example of Commerce Clause authority over intrastate activity." Id.
c9 Id.; see also Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic & State Univ., 935 F. Supp.
779, 791 (W.D. Va. 1996) (arguing that Doe's reliance on Wickard to analyze "non-
economic [sic] intrastate activity is not tenable").
70 Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1634 ("The possession of a gun in a local school zone is in
no sense an economic activity that might, through repetition elsewhere, substan-
tially affect any sort of interstate commerce."); see also Brzonkala, 935 F. Supp. at
791-92 (finding economic-noneconomic distinction); Althouse, supra note 59, at 818
(using aggregate theory only when instances of violence interact between states;
thus gun violence is local because instances of violence in one state do not contribute
to problem in another state). It has been suggested that because some noneconomic
activities which are related to economic activities might be regulated, VAWA, which
might "free [business] operation[s] from the adverse effects of discriminatory gen-
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The distinction between economic activity and noneconomic
activity, and the noneconomic nature of the regulated activity at
issue, were highlighted by the Lopez Court.7 While the Supreme
Court did not declare that noneconomic activity could never be
regulated under the Commerce Clause,72 statutes regarding such
activities should receive closer scrutiny. Although the economic-
noneconomic distinction is not a bright-line," those statutes
which do not regulate clearly commercial activity, have no evi-
dent commercial nexus, and concern traditionally state-regulated
activities, should have some clear, important link to interstate
commerce. 4 The level of scrutiny the Doe court gave to VAWA,
which is an example of just such a statute, did not demonstrate
such sufficient linkage.
der-based violence," could be viewed as "regulating business," analogous with
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (allowing regulation banning racial dis-
crimination in restaurants), and Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S.
241 (1964) (upholding regulation banning racial discrimination in hotels). Maloney,
supra note 9, at 1916-17. There are problems, however, with this analysis. First, the
challenged statutes in Katzenbach and Heart of Atlanta regulated the establish-
ments in question, and thus were directly related to business practices, whereas
VAWA provides a civil rights remedy for injuries, but does not regulate businesses
themselves. Second, such a characterization of VAWA would ultimately allow any
noneconomic statute to be "hooked" onto business activity, thus logically allowing
unlimited regulation. Third, Katzenbach and Heart of Atlanta must be viewed in the
context of their times, as decisions made in a vacuum of inaction on the part of the
states. See Bassler, supra note 8, at 1171 (contrasting inaction of states regarding
racial discrimination at time of Katzenbach and Heart of Atlanta with states' pres-
ent efforts to combat domestic violence). States are actively involved in improving
their responses to violence against women. See supra notes 5-8.
71 Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630; see also Philip P. Frickey, The Fool on the Hill:
Congressional Findings, Constitutional Adjudication, and United States v. Lopez,
46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 695, 706 (1996) (noting commercial-noncommercial dis-
tinction in Lopez); Merritt, supra note 38, at 695 (predicting that commercial-
noncommercial distinction will be significant in post-Lopez Commerce Clause chal-
lenges).
72 See, e.g., Malcolm Stewart, United States v. Lopez: A Governmental Perspec-
tive, 32 IDAHO L. REV. 519, 520 (1996) (noting that Lopez Court did not determine
noneconomic nature of statute sufficient to declare statute unconstitutional in iso-
lation from other factors).
73 See Merritt, supra note 38, at 747-48 (noting "fuzziness" of commercial-
noncommercial distinction and suggesting activities are more or less economic).
74 See Frickey, supra note 71, at 706 (noting "Lopez held that a regulation that
is noneconomic in character may be justified, under the Commerce Clause, only
when its subject matter has a significant linkage to commercial transactions of an
interstate magnitude, especially if it invades a core state function"); see also
Stewart, supra note 72, at 520 (identifying three factors of importance in Lopez as
"non-economic [sic] character of the conduct, the fact that it was a matter tradi-
tionally regulated by the state, and the attenuated nature of the nexus").
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C. Congressional Findings: Not Necessary But Sufficient?
The Doe court granted extreme deference to the congres-
sional findings of VAWA." Although the Supreme Court in
Lopez referred to the absence of legislative findings on the Gun-
Free School Zones Act and indicated that such findings would
have been helpful in determining the relationship between gun
possession and interstate commerce,76 the Court's holding did not
hinge exclusively on the absence of findings.77 Conversely, the
mere presence of findings does not guarantee congressional
authority.6 To allow findings to substitute for judicial review,
rather than function as an aid to it, would ignore the expressed
concerns in Lopez of abrogating powers traditionally reserved to
the states and maintaining a federal-state balance. 9 If the mere
provision of findings can validate congressional authority, theo-
retically there could be no limit to the powers exercised by Con-
gress under the Commerce Clause, as it is likely that there can
be a demonstration that most activities have a substantial, albeit
indirect, effect on interstate commerce. Hypothetically, Con-
gress could pass national divorce laws by presenting findings il-
lustrating the substantial effect of divorce on interstate com-
merce.8" It is highly unlikely, however, that the Supreme Court
would find a Federal Divorce Act passed under the Commerce
Clause an acceptable exercise of congressional power.8' Thus,
7" Doe, 929 F. Supp. at 613-14.
76 Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631-32.
7 Id. at 1631 ("We agree with the Government that Congress normally is not
required to make formal findings as to the substantial burdens that an activity has
on interstate commerce."); see also United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1367-68 (5th
Cir. 1993) (striking down statute entirely based on lack of findings), affd, 115 S. Ct.
1624(1995).
78 See Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic & State Univ., 935 F. Supp. 779, 790
(W.D. Va. 1996) (indicating that "findings are not necessary for a determination of
whether a rational relation to interstate commerce exists"); Barry Friedman, Legis-
lative Findings and Judicial Signals: A Positive Political Reading of United States
v. Lopez, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 757, 763-64, 771-772 (1996) (citing Frickey, supra
note 71, at 720 (positing that findings alone are insufficient because they may be
standard and meaningless)).
See Brzonkala, 935 F. Supp. at 792; Friedman, supra note 78, at 775, 790.
'o See United States v. Wall, 92 F.3d 1444, 1471 (6th Cir. 1996) (Boggs, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part) ("[A] federal domestic relations law is not
authorized by the Commerce Clause simply because marital beds are purchased in
interstate commerce."), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 690 (1997).
8' Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1632 (arguing that "national productivity" argument could
extend congressional regulation to divorce); Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689,
702 (1992) (affirming statutory domestic relations exception to diversity jurisdiction
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proper analysis under the "substantially affects" test cannot stop
at the mere provision of findings when dealing with a
noneconomic statute. Rather, the court must also consider the
quality of the link between the noneconomic activity and inter-
state commerce.82
II. FEDERALISM VS. THE NEEDS OF WOMEN: STRIKING A
BALANCE
The civil rights remedy of VAWA was enacted partially due
to concerns about the states' responses to violence against
women.' Such an intrusion into a matter of traditional state
law, however, minimizes the increasingly improved response of
state police, prosecutorial, and judicial systems to the problem.'
It also discounts two major benefits of intervention at the state
level: the expertise of state courts in the area," and the capacity
of the states to experiment with local solutions. 8 That a problem
occurs nationwide does not in and of itself mandate a federal
for divorce, alimony, and child custody decrees); see also Anne C. Dailey, Federalism
and Families, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1787, 1789-90 (1995) (asserting importance of state
regulating local activities such as divorce).
See supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text (discussing economic-
noneconomic distinction).
8 See supra note 10; see also Maloney, supra note 9, at 1883, 1885-86
(indicating that dual reasons for passage were scope of problem and inadequacy of
states' response).
84See supra notes 3-8. In addition to case law, there have been statutory enact-
ments at the state level that reflect growing state concern about domestic violence.
See, e.g., Family Protection and Domestic Violence Intervention Act of 1994, 1994
N.Y. Laws §§ 2, 9 (McKinney 1995) (requiring police to inform victim in domestic
dispute about services available and mandatory arrest upon request of victim).
When the behavior of a batterer is recognized as criminal and procedures are en-
acted to support the victim throughout the prosecution process, the result is an in-
crease in prosecutions of batterers. See Naomi R. Cahn & Lisa G. Lerman, Prosecut-
ing Woman Abuse, in WOMAN BATTERING: POLICY RESPONSES 95, 97-98 (Michael
Steinman ed., 1991).
8' See Bassler, supra note 8, at 1184 (noting superior skills of state courts in
domestic violence area and greater extent of resources for victims in state court);
Betty Levinson, The Civil Rights Remedy of the Violence Against Women Act: Legis-
lative History, Policy Implications, and Litigation Strategy, 4 J.L. & POL'Y 401, 406
(1996) (recommending use of state court to bring VAWA action due to greater ex-
pertise of state judges in domestic violence).
6 See Victoria Davis, Note, A Landmark Lost: The Anemic Impact of United
States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995), on the Federalization of Criminal Law, 75
NEB. L. REV. 117, 143-44 (1996) (noting virtues of states as "laboratories of experi-
mentation" due to greater political accountability and social service resources of lo-
cal officials); Gee, supra note 38, at 187 (emphasizing benefits of experimenting with
various solutions to social problems).
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level response that treads on constitutional principles. s7 Fur-
thermore, the reach and effect of the VAWA's civil rights remedy
remain to be seen. Despite complaints about deficiencies in state
courts which were the impetus for VAWA's passage, a suit for
damages under the civil rights action may be brought in either
state or federal court.' The civil rights remedy may be limited to
a small group able to afford the costs and withstand the delay
involved in a lawsuit, may introduce difficult issues of proof,89
and may be unnecessarily duplicative of existing state remedies.
Additionally, the VAWA's potential impact on federal courts
cannot be ignored. Critics of the expanding federalization of
crimes have noted the increasing burden on the federal docket.0
Although the VAWA civil rights remedy is not a criminal provi-
sion, it is similar to federalized crimes in that it permits a large
volume of actions traditionally tried in state courts to be brought
in federal courts." Chief Justice Rehnquist has repeatedly
7 See Althouse, supra note 59, at 818 (distinguishing problems which require
national solutions from those which, although occurring nationwide, may be best
addressed locally).
s VAWA § 13981(e)(3) (1994) (stating that federal and state courts have concur-
rent jurisdiction over actions brought under Act). If brought initially in state court,
however, the action cannot be removed to federal court. Additionally, supplemental
or pendant jurisdiction over marital and child custody actions is specifically barred.
VAWA § 13981(e)(4). Although these provisions were amendments introduced due to
concerns about the effect of § 13981 on the federal court docket and the fear that it
would open the federal courthouse door to divorce proceedings, see Bassler, supra
note 8, at 1147-48, 1154 & n.78, the amendments paradoxically reduce the availabil-
ity of the federal courts to plaintiffs, which was one of the original purposes of the
law. Additionally, because issues of divorce or child custody will often be intertwined
with instances of domestic violence, plaintiffs will either be forced to begin separate
actions in state and federal court, an expensive and wasteful procedure, or consoli-
date their action in state court.
8 The plaintiff has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence
that the attack was motivated by gender animus. The Act specifically does not cover
"random acts of violence." VAWA § 13981(e)(1). See Bassler, supra note 8, at 1169
(discussing how problems of proof will limit number of women who can use remedy).
For a general discussion of the issues arising in determining which acts are bias
crimes, see Kristin L. Taylor, Note, Treating Male Violence Against Women as a
Bias Crime, 76 B.U. L. RsV. 575 (1996).
' See Bassler, supra note 8, at 1148-59 (noting potential effect on quality of fed-
eral courts created by already overloaded civil and criminal docket). Bassler pro-
vides statistics indicating a tripling in the district court caseload between 1960 and
1988, and an 897% increase in filings in federal courts of appeals from 1960 to 1988.
Id. at 1151-52 & nn.63 & 67.
9' See supra note 88; Davis, supra note 86, at 142. Davis notes that civil cases
frequently must wait to be heard for long periods of time because of the constraints
imposed by the burgeoning federal crime docket. Id. at 141. This would further limit
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voiced his concerns on this issue," and specifically objected to the
1990 version of VAWA on this basis. 3 The enacted version of the
VAWA raises analogous concerns in that it provides remedies
arguably duplicative of those already available in state courts. 4
The VAWA raises fundamental issues concerning federalism
and the proper role of the federal and state governments in the
federal system. 5 The Supreme Court's renewed concern with the
proper state-federal balance is evident in Lopez," as well as in
the more recent decision in Seminole Tribe v. Florida,97 which
placed limits on Congress's authority to abrogate the Eleventh
Amendment immunity of the states.
The gun control statute at issue in Lopez "federalized a local
crime"" and thus intruded on a traditional state area. The por-
tion of VAWA providing a federal civil rights remedy for activi-
ties that would constitute crimes at the state level, likewise cre-
ates a questionable intrusion upon a state domain. Unlike the
civil rights remedy, however, those portions of VAWA which
women's access to federal courts.
See William H. Rehnquist, 1995 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary, 19
AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 491, 494-95 (1996) (discussing problem of increasing case load);
William H. Rehnquist, 1994 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary, 18 AM. J.
TRIAL ADVOC. 499, 502-03 (1995) (noting "considerable sentiment" in federal judici-
ary "against further expansion of federal jurisdiction into areas which have been
previously the province of state courts enforcing state laws").
93 See Bassler, supra note 8, at 1148-49. Many of the initial objections of the
Judicial Conference of the United States Ad Hoc Commission On Gender Based
Violence, however, were resolved by amendments to the Act barring supplemental
and removal jurisdiction. Id. at 1149, nn.45 & 46; see § 13981(e)(4) (barring supple-
mental jurisdiction); 28 U.S.C. § 1445(d) (1994 & Supp. 1996) (barring removal of
claims brought in state court to federal district court); supra note 88.
It can be argued, however, that the remedy is not duplicative because it pro-
vides a cause of action for gender-motivated violence often not available at the state
level. Although formal state criminal charges need not have been brought in order to
institute an action under VAWA, the violent act must be one which would constitute
a felony under state or federal codes, except in those situations where it would con-
stitute a felony but for the relationship of the parties involved. §§ 13981(d)(2)(A) &
(d)(2)(B).
95 See Baker, supra note 38, at 754 (criticizing 1994 Crime Control Act, of which
VAWA is part, for assigning "a secondary role to the states, to act as grantees and
agents of the congressional principal"); Davis, supra note 86, at 140-42 (passing
VAWA by Congress was done while ignoring concerns of judiciary).
9 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
9 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996); see Nicole Veilleux, Note, Staying Death Penalty Exe-
cutions: An Empirical Analysis of Changing Judicial Attitudes, 84 GEO. L.J. 2543,
2570 (1996) (suggesting that Seminole Tribe and Lopez indicate "recent resurgence
of interest in federalism and the right of state autonomy").
98 Kathleen F. Brickey, Crime Control and the Commerce Clause: Life After
Lopez, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 801, 839 (1996).
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provide funding for training of police officers, improvements in
the state court systems, and educational efforts would directly
address the problems identified in state courts and benefit all
victims of violence against women.99 These portions provide an
excellent example of how the nation's resources can be used most
effectively to combat this problem.
CONCLUSION
The problem of violence against women is real and compel-
ling, but the provision of a politically popular federal civil rights
remedy as a method of combating it creates numerous problems,
including an unwarranted congressional intrusion into a domain
traditionally reserved to the states. Given the Supreme Court's
decision in Lopez, the constitutionality of the civil rights remedy
of VAWA as an exercise of Commerce Clause power is question-
able. The Doe court incorrectly brushed aside serious questions
of constitutionality and federalism in its rush to uphold this
provision. Ultimately, the states can best be assisted in combat-
ing the problem of violence against women through those provi-
sions of VAWA which provide funding for training and education
in our state police and court systems, thereby benefiting the vast
majority of women who seek help at the state level.
Mary C. Carty*
See Bassler, supra note 8, at 1160 ("By providing much needed funding in
critical areas, the VAWA exemplifies 'cooperative federalism,' which combines fed-
eral funding with state enforcement powers to achieve national objectives in a
flexible and decentralized manner.").
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